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DIGEST OF RECENT U. S. CASES
CUSTOMS-UNANTICIPATED

ENTRY INTO UNITED STATES-

FORFEITURE OF UNDECLARED PROPERTY
United States v. 532.83 Carats,More or Less, of Cut and Polished Diamonds
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,982 (D. Mass., Jan. 19, 1955).
The claimant, an airline passenger enroute from Europe to Canada, was
forced to deplane in the United States due to weather conditions, although
no stop in the United States was scheduled or contemplated. While awaiting
transportation to return him to Canada, he was approached by a customs
official who discovered the diamonds in question, which the claimant was
carrying on his person. The diamonds were seized, and the United States
brings this action seeking to have its legal claim to the diamonds recognized,
on the ground that, since the diamonds were not declared, they were subject
to forfeiture as provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1497. The government's motion for
a summary judgment was granted, the court holding irrelevant the fact that
coming to the United States was contrary to the claimant's intention and
reasonable anticipation. Since the traveler might take advantage of the
accident or his misintended entry into the United States to make an importation that he had not originally contemplated, the government has a
legitimate concern to discover what such a traveler has on his person or
in his baggage. Therefore, the statutes should be strictly interpretated and
every person entering the United States, regardless of his intent in entering,
should declare his possessions, in order to protect them from forfeiture.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-SIMILARITY OF NAMES OF AIR
CARRIERS-SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC CONFUSION
American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc.
351 U. S. 79 (April 23, 1956).
The CAB, after instituting an investigation under § 411 of the CAA,
which enables the board, ". . . if it considers that action by it would be in
" to investigate and determine whether an
the interest of the public ...
air carrier has been engaging in unfair methods of competition, decided
that substantial public confusion had arisen between the names "North
American Airlines, Inc." and "American Airlines, Inc." Since the confusion
was likely to continue and constituted an unfair method of competition, the
board issued a cease and desist order forbidding North American from
operating under a name containing any combination of the word "American."
The Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, interpreting § 411 in the light
of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act after which § 411 was modeled,
set aside the order on the ground that the FTCA does not provide private
persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs, and that the
public interest was not shown to be specific and substantial and did not
demand the cease and desist order. The Supreme Court granted American
Airlines certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals, drawing a distinction
between the CAA and the FTCA. The FTCA is concerned with purely
private business enterprises which cover the full spectrum of economic
activity, while the business conducted by air carriers is of especial and
essential concern to the public. Furthermore, the CAB is an agency of
special competence which deals only with the problems of the air transportation industry. For these reasons, the determination of public interest is
to the judgment of the board, and the only questions for judicial review are
whether, in reaching its decision, the board has stayed within its jurisdic-
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tion and applied appropriate criteria. Since the board did not exceed its
jurisdiction and had applied appropriate criteria, i.e., high standards required of common carriers in dealing with the public, convenience of the
travelling public, speed and efficiency in air transportation, and protection
of reliance on a carrier's equipment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
was reversed, and the case was remanded for a determination whether the
board's findings were supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Reed,
argued that, to constitute a violation of § 411, there should have been a
finding that the confusion arising from the use of the two names had actually
caused some impairment of air service or that at least there was an immediate threat of such impairment, rather than a naked finding of "substantial
public confusion."
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-USE OF PRIVATE AIRPLANE
AS ACTING WITHIN SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Indiana Steel Products Co. v. Leonard
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 17,998 (Ind. App. Ct., Jan. 10, 1956).
Beebe v. Horton
293 P. 2d 661 (Idaho Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 1956).
In the Leonard case, the decedent was last seen alive entering his airplane and preparing to take off on an anticipated business trip. He was not
seen again until his body was washed ashore some four months later on
the opposite side of Lake Michigan from his intended destination. In the
hearing on the application for workmen's compensation, the only evidence
on the question of whether the decedent was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of his death was the testimony of a friend and
fellow employee of the decedent, that the decedent had said that he was
going to call on customers. Compensation was awarded. On appeal, the
court, ruling that the above testimony was properly admitted under the
present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, upheld the award on
the ground that using a plane to call on customers in furtherance of the
master's business did not constitute a rash act on the part of the decedent,
and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that
the death arose out of and in the course of the decedent's employment. If
the circumstances are such that a reasonable inference can be drawn that
there was something connected with the employment which was responsible,
then compensation can be given.
In the Beebe case, on the other hand, the Idaho Supreme Court, although
purporting to give a liberal construction to the Workmen's Compensation
Act, held that each case must be decided on its own facts. In this case the
decedent, immediately before going to the airport, had been acting pursuant
to his customary duties as manager of a nursing home. He then departed
for the airport accompanied by one of his superiors, and the two men rented
a small plane, the superior taking the controls. Although the purpose of
the flight was not disclosed by the evidence, the plane was seen 'flying in the
direction of the nursing home, and the place of the crash was only 100 to
150 feet from the land on which the home was situated. While these facts
would establish some connection between the employment and the accident
and would undoubtedly be sufficient to support the presumption employed
in the Leonard case, the court reversed an award on the ground that the
decedent's work did not create the necessity for such an airplane flight, nor
was the flight reasonably connected or incident to his occupation as manager
of the nursing home.
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TAXATION-SITUS PRIOR TO FIRST INTERSTATE FLIGHT OF
AIRPLANE PURCHASED FOR INTERSTATE COMMERCE NOT
DETERMINATIVE OF SITUS FOR FULL TAX YEARRULE OF APPORTIONMENT GOVERNS
Slick Airways, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 18,059 (Cal. D. Ct. of App., March 28, 1956).
The plaintiff, an interstate air carrier was authorized to transact business in California and conducted some of its business in the defendant
county. Following the approved practice of taxation by nondomiciliary
states of corporations engaged in interstate commerce, the defendant county
assessed the plaintiff's fleet of airplanes on the basis of a fair allocation of
time, to wit, the ratio of the time spent in Los Angeles County as compared
to total time. However, the plaintiff had recently purchased a new airplane,
and at the date of determining the taxable status of property, the plane had
not made a flight in interstate commerce. Although the plane in question
was purchased for the exclusive purpose of adding to the plaintiff's fleet of
aircraft flying in interstate commerce, and although it was reasonably
apparent that it would be in actual commercial operation during all of the
tax year, except for that immediate period, the defendant determined that
the plane was not then a part of the plaintiff's fleet, and classified it as an
individual item of property, resulting in a higher assessed valuation. The
plaintiff sued to recover the taxes paid under this increased valuation, and
the court affirmed a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. While the
taxable status of property is determined in most jurisdictions as of some
fixed date, the rule which allows a state in which property is physically
located on a specific tax date to tax the property at full value must yield to
the extent required by the due process and commerce clauses of the Federal
Constitution, and the assessment of taxes on property which receives benefits in more than one state during the tax year is governed by the rule of
apportionment.
CONDEMNATION-EASEMENTS-NO COMPENSATION FOR
DAMAGES OR DIMINUTION IN PROPERTY VALUE
RESULTING FROM FLIGHTS OVER LAND
United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, More or Less
137 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Texas Jan. 14, 1956).
The government brought condemnation proceedings to acquire by the
right of eminent domain an easement extending outward from the ends of
certain airport runways and over-lying privately owned property. The exact
estate condemned, as set out in the Declaration of Taking, consisted merely
of the right to remove and prohibit any obstruction from infringing upon
or extending into or above the "glide angle plane." The government filed
motions asking that the proceedings be referred to a commission under
Rule 71A, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and further requested that the
commissioners, if a reference were ordered, be instructed that just compensation extends only to the estate acquired and not to damages or diminution in value, if any, of the condemnees' land resulting from the flight of
aircraft over such property. The court held that, because the easement and
rights here condemned were unusual and presented exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, e.g., the height of the "glide angle plane" above the
ground varied from tract to tract, the differing degrees of development and
divergent uses made of the different tracts, and the varying distances of
the tracts from the airport, it was not an abuse of its discretion to refer
the proceedings to a commission, even though the condemnees had demanded
a jury trial.
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In addition, the court held that the commissioners could not compensate
for any damages occasioned or likely to be occasioned by the flight of
aircraft in the airspace above the "glide angle plane." The government
had not acquired in these proceedings the right to make such use of that
airspace, but had merely acquired title to the exact easement or estate
described in the Declaration of Taking. Although flying aircraft over the
property here involved may constitute a "taking," and the land-owners may
have a right to bring a separate suit against the government for damages
or just compensation in such a situation, this right may not be asserted as
a "counterclaim" in a condemnation suit.
TARIFF RATE-LIMITED LIABILITY OF CARRIER
New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Riddle Airlines, Inc.
2 CCH Aviation L. Rep. 18,069 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Trial Term, April 10,
1956).
Plaintiff, a mining company, made a shipment of bouillon from its mines
in Central America to New York, the shipment being made by a foreign air
carrier with the defendant as connecting and terminal carrier. In order to
secure a reduced transportation rate, the plaintiff deliberately undervaluea
the shipment at the time of the delivery of the shipment to the initial carrier. The reduced valuation was inserted in the airway bill, which became
the contract between the parties and which, by its terms, was binding on,
and inured to the benefit of the defendant as connecting and terminal
carrier. The initial carrier then filed with the CAB an amended tariff based
upon the released value. Sometime after the shipment came into the hands
of the defendant and before delivery at its destination in New York, half
the bullion was lost, and the plaintiff sued to recover its loss. An award in
favor of the plaintiff was limited to the value declared at the time of shipment. An agreed upon value in case of liability made for the purpose of
obtaining a reduced freight rate, is binding on the shipper, even in case of
loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-CIVIL AIR PATROL NOT A
FEDERAL AGENCY AS DEFINED IN THE TORT CLAIMS ACT
Pearl v. United States
230 F. 2d 243 (10th Cir., Feb. 8, 1956).
The decedent was killed while riding as a passenger on an official indoctrination flight of the Civil Air Patrol, and a complaint was filed seeking
damages for the decedent's wrongful death under the Tort Claims Act. The
court affirmed an order dismissing the suit, on the ground that the CAP
was not a federal agency as defined in the Tort Claims Act. Because its
primary objective is to promote the public welfare and not for the pecuniary
profit of its members, it is clear that the CAP was chartered as an independent nongovernmental agency. Furthermore, since it is neither a wholly
owned government corporation, nor a "mixed-ownership government corporation," but rather subject only to such control as Congress exerts over
virtually all private corporations granted federal charters, the CAP should
not be classified as a corporation "primarily acting as [an] instrumentality
of the United States." The court further held that the mere fact that the
plane involved in the crash was on loan from the Air Force did not constitute the pilot, a member of the CAP, an employee of the government,

